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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
THE CODE IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS:
SOME SIGNIFICANT CONFLICTS OF POLICY
In a credit-oriented economy, the relationship between the bankruptcy
courts and secured creditors can obviously be critical. With the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code in forty-seven states,' it is of paramount
importance that the secured credit provisions of both the Code and the
Bankruptcy Act 2
 be compatible, at least to the extent that neither can
frustrate the basic purposes of the other. Writers have commented upon poten-
tial conflicts since the very conception of the Code,8 and two recent cases4
have demonstrated that the conflicts are not only real but, in some areas,
fundamental. This comment will examine the relationship between secured
creditors and the bankruptcy courts in the light of this recent litigation.
1. THE CASES
In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co. 5 is the first case in which
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were held to be in conflict with
the Federal Bankruptcy Act. This case concerned a newspaper publishing
company which had been formed by a number of labor unions whose members
were on strike against two local papers. To provide space for this new
venture, eighty-eight union locals then formed the Rose City Development
Company. In the course of its dealings with the newspaper, Rose City took a
security interest in present and future accounts receivable. Pursuant to
section 9-205 of the Code,6 the newspaper was permitted to retain control
over the collateral without accounting to the creditor. One year after the
1
 Only Arizona, Idaho, and Louisana have not enacted the Code.
2 Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964).
3
 E.g., Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 35 Va. L. Rev. 577 (1949) ; Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the
Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 76
(1951) ; Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 183 (1951) ; Note, Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code—A Potential Policy Conflict With the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 2
VW. L. Rev. 395 (1957) ; Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-
Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194 (1959) ; Kennedy, The
Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested
By Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518 (1960) ; Riemer, Conflict Between Section
9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 Corn. L.J.
63 (1965).
4 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.) f 61722
(D. Ore. Feb. 9, 1966) ; In the Matter of Yale Express Sys., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
S 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (4th ed.) 11 61722 (D. Ore. Feb. 9, 1966).
6
 For purposes of this comment, all citations to the Uniform Commercial Code
refer to the 1962 Official Text of the American Law Institute, rather than to the various
state statutes. There are no state variations from the Official Text which are pertinent
to the comment.
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security agreement was signed, the newspaper was adjudged a bankrupt.
The trustee refused to permit Rose City to claim the proceeds of the news-
paper's accounts, which had been collected and were held jointly by the
trustee and a representative of the secured creditors. He contended that the
security interest was a preferential transfer7
 and thus voidable under the
Bankruptcy Act. In support of this contention, the trustee argued that
substantially all the accounts had been received within the four months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, that Rose City
was aware of the newspaper's insolvency at all times during the four-month
period, and that since Rose City's interest in the accounts could not be per-
fected until they were obtained by the debtor, the transfer had occurred
during the four-month period and was thus a voidable transfer of the debtor's
property in payment of an antecedent debt.
In accepting the trustee's position, the referee rejected the claimant's
argument that under section 9-108 of the Code an interest in after-acquired
property is deemed to be taken for new value, and not for antecedent debt. 8
The referee held that section 9-108 represented an attempt by the state to
contravene the Federal Bankruptcy Act by imposing upon the bankruptcy
courts an unacceptable definition of antecedent debt; it was therefore
inoperative.
The referee referred to section 9-108 as a "fiction"9
 and concluded that
"if no new value is actually given at the time, then the lien as to such property
is in truth and in fact perfected as security for an antecedent debt." 1° The
referee acknowledged that the claimant might have avoided the preference
challenge if it had insisted upon policing the accounts." Under this procedure,
the creditor must retain control over proceeds in a cash collateral account
and pay them to the debtor periodically in exchange for an assignment of
new accounts, thus giving "new value" for each successive security interest.
The effect of the referee's holding, therefore, is not to make the lien on
current and future accounts voidable per se, but rather to make it potentially
unenforceable in bankruptcy unless the creditor has policed the accounts.
A second case illustrates a different aspect of the relationship between
the Code and the Bankruptcy Act. In the Matter of Yale Express Sys., Inc.' 2
involved an attempt by the holder of a chattel mortgage to reclaim the
collateral from a defaulting debtor. The chattel mortgagee had originally sold
trailers and truck bodies to Yale for nearly $380,000; payment was to have
7
 The elements of a preferential transfer are set out in detail at pp. 104-05 infra.
8
 Section 9-108 reads as follows:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a
perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured
in whole or in part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either
in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value
is given.
9
 Supra note 5, at 71142.
10 Id. at 71143.
11 Id. at 71136.
12
 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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been made in cash thirty days after the delivery of each truck and ninety
days after the delivery of each trailer. Apparently, the seller had relied upon
a mercantile agency's report which showed that Yale was in good financial
condition. Upon learning from Yale that the report was in error, and that
Yale had in fact operated at a loss during the period covered by the report,
the seller claimed from the buyer the right to repossess the trucks and
trailers for which payment had not yet been made. After negotiation,
however, the seller agreed to take a purchase money security interest in the
form of chattel mortgages and to permit Yale to pay for the equipment on
an installment basis. Two months later, Yale filed its petition for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. 13
When the buyer defaulted on the installment payments, the seller
applied to the reorganization court for reclamation of the property. The court
denied the application, citing provisions of the Bankruptcy Act which give
the court the power to postpone the foreclosure of liens on the "property of
the debtor" until reorganization can be effected." The court indicated that
in establishing what exactly was "the property of the debtor," the location
of title was determinative, and that a reclamation which might jeopardize
reorganization of a debtor corporation would not be allowed if title to the
property in question was in the debtor. The seller contended that under
section 9-503 of the Code, it had the right to reclaim collateral from a de-
faulting debtor either by peaceable repossession or by judicial process.
Petitioner argued further that this right was not vitiated by the lack of
title, since section 9-202 of the Code provides that as between debtor and
creditor the location of title is immaterial. The court stated, however, that
in applying the Bankruptcy Act, appellate courts have preserved the distinc-
tion between the chattel mortgage and the conditional sale insofar as they
locate title to the collateral," and that in this case the chattel mortgages
represented only a lien on, as opposed to title in, the property. The opinion
thus recognized that had the security agreement been written as a conditional
sale, reclamation would have been permitted, despite the potentially harmful
effect on the pending reorganization."
The Yale and Portland News cases illustrate two different aspects of
the relationship between the secured creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy.
In order to recognize the common implications of the cases, an examination
of the two relevant statutes is necessary.
IL THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
State-created rights of a consensual lien-holder may be affected by
bankruptcy proceedings in several ways. The provisions of the Bankruptcy
13
 Bankruptcy Act §f 101-276, added by 52 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 501-676 (1964).
14 Bankruptcy Act § 116(4), added by 52 Stat. 885 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 516(4) (1964).
16 250 F. Supp, at 254.
16
 Since the application was denied, the case does not actually hold that property can
be reclaimed whenever the creditor has used a title retention device. It is, however, the
clear implication of the opinion that had this been the case, the reclamation would have
been allowed.
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Act which are relevant in Portland News give the bankruptcy courts the
power to avoid transfers of the debtor's property, including security interests,17
which are preferential and thus contrary to the act's policy of equitable
distribution among creditors. 18 Specifically, section 60 of the act defines
the elements of a preference as: (1) a transfer of the debtor's property,
(2) to or for the benefit of a creditor, made or suffered (3) while insolvent,
and (4) within four months of the filing of a petition under the act, (5) for
or on account of an antecedent debt, (6) the effect of which is to permit
that creditor to realize a higher percentage in payment than other creditors
of the same class. 1. 9 The time of transfer is established as the point at which
no lien creditor could obtain superior rights in the property through legal or
equitable proceedings on a simple contract. Transfers not so perfected under
applicable state law are deemed to have been made immediately prior to
the filing of the petition. 20 The trustee may avoid the transfer upon showing
17 Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), as amended, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C.
	 1(30)
(1964).
18 Some of the provisions which are not relevant to this comment should be set out
to give context to the material presented. The Bankruptcy Act provides that the trustee in
bankruptcy shall have the status of an hypothetical lien creditor. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c),
as amended, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964) ; 4 Collier, Bankruptcy
70.49 (14th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Collier]. Thus security interests not fully
perfected against a lien creditor under applicable state law cannot be enforced against the
estate. To protect creditors from fraudulent transfers and insider manipulation, the act also
sets out a variety of objective standards which may be referred to for purposes of
nullifying transactions made as long as one year before the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings. Bankruptcy Act § 67, as amended, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107
(1964).
The act also gives the federal courts equity jurisdiction in bankruptcy. The act reads:
"[C]ourts of bankruptcy are created . . . and invested ... with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction . . . (2) allow claims,
disallow claims . . ." Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (2), as amended, 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 11(a) (2) (1964). In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the Supreme Court
interpreted the act as enabling the courts to disallow or subordinate the claim of a lien-
holder whose "planned and fraudulent scheme" to prejudice other creditors would other-
wise succeed in defeating the equitable distribution of the bankrupt estate. Id. at 312.
Similarly, the courts have the power to disallow or subordinate claims of controlling
parties who have mismanaged the bankrupt, Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S.
307 (1939), of creditors who have fraudulently led other creditors to take actions which
were to their detriment, Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935), and
of creditors who have obtained security under unconscionable contracts, In the Matter of
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (ED. Pa. 1966).
It should be noted that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
has the effect of making the validity of a claim a question of state law, except to the
extent that Congress has specifically legislated to the contrary. The courts are free,
however, to disallow or subordinate a valid claim on equitable grounds which relate to
the distribution of a bankrupt estate. See 3 Collier 63.03(3]; Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953). One case appears to have invalidated a claim
on federal grounds. In the Matter of Laskin, 316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963), 5 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 430 (1964).
19 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. 96(a)(1)
(1964). For purposes of section 60(a), secured and unsecured creditors are members of
the same class. See 3 Collier 60.34.
20 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (2), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2)
(1964).
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that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent at the time of transfer. 2' Such a creditor is thus prevented from
protecting himself at the expense of other creditors in the four months
preceding bankruptcy.
In order to fully appreciate the scope of section 60, it is important
to note one additional provision which has no direct bearing on the Portland
News case. This provision deals with the so-called "pocket lien." Under the
laws of some states, the holder of an equitable lien, such as an unrecorded
chattel mortgage, could take possession of the collateral at any time, and
the date of the transfer would relate back to the date of acquisition of the
equitable lien.22 In order to protect other creditors, who might have extended
credit in the belief that the debtor's property was unencumbered, section
60(a)(6) provides that an equitable lien which could be perfected legally
against other good faith creditors, must be so perfected. Otherwise it will be
considered a transfer made immediately before bankruptcy, and thus be
subject to avoidance if the other elements of a preference exist. 23
Additional checks upon the rights of secured creditors are provided by
the chapters of the Bankruptcy Act which are designed to rehabilitate
the debtor. For example, while a petition for reorganization is pending, the
court may grant, as it did in Yale, a stay of any judicial proceeding or
temporarily enjoin any other attempt to enforce a lien on the property of the
debtor.24 After approval of a petition, such a stay is provided automatically. 25
The Bankruptcy Act does not specifically define the term "property"
for this purpose. In the leading case, In re Lake's Laundry, Inc.," the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the location of title was deterrnina-
21 Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), as amended, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b)
(1964).
22 Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
23 Some discussion of the legislative history of section 60 may be necessary to put
the preference challenge into perspective. Under the 1938 amendment to the act the
problem of the secret lien was treated by fixing the date of all transfers at the point when
no bona fide purchaser could acquire superior rights in the property. 52 Stat. 869 (1938).
While this served to avoid the doctrine of relation back, it also produced unexpected
results. In Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), the Court held that
an assignment of accounts receivable was voidable as a preference because the assignee had
not complied with state requirements necessary to protect the transfer from a possible
second assignment. The transfer had been made long before the four-month period.
Recognizing that the wording of section 60 had the potential to jeopardize many
legitimate transactions (including trust receipts and conditional sales, virtually imperfectible
against bona fide purchasers), Congress in the 1950 amendment to the act put the trustee
in the position of a lien creditor by fixing the date of transfer with respect to the rights
of potential lien creditors. 64 Stat. 25 (1950). To avoid the secret lien, section 60(a)(6)
of the act now requires that an equitable lien which could be perfected against bona
fide purchasers must be so perfected before the transfer is deemed to have been made. Thus,
legal encumbrances effective more than four months before bankruptcy are not voidable
under section 60; purely equitable liens are voidable unless there was no way to perfect
them legally. See generally 3 Collier if 60.38; Conwill and Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing:
The Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 62
(1950).
24 Bankruptcy Act § 113, added by 52 Stat. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 513 (1964).
25 Bankruptcy Act § 148, added by 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1964)
26 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935).
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tive; where state Iaw gave a conditional vendor title to the property until it
was paid for, the seller could reclaim it from a defaulting debtor in reorga-
nization.27 The opinion in Yale indicates that this remains the law today.28
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Outside the bankruptcy court, the relationships among the secured
creditor, the debtor, and third parties are governed in most jurisdictions by
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code provides the states with a com-
prehensive commercial statute which was intended by its draftsmen to be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate existing security devices and to permit
the development of legitimate business techniques without constant legislative
change." The Code distinguishes transactions along functional lines, avoiding
distinctions based on form alone. Title to the collateral is considered unimpor-
tant as between debtor and creditor, regardless of the form of the security
interest," and the rights of the parties in the event of a default are made
more uniform than they were under older law. 37
Article 9 provides a mechanism for establishing a "floating lien" on
assets such as inventory and accounts receivable, which normally "turn
over" in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.32
 Under the Code, a
security agreement may provide that after-acquired as well as presently
owned property will serve as security for the debtor's obligation." Moreover,
the security agreement may provide that the debtor will have the power to use
or dispose of the collateral at will, without an accounting to the creditor."
This is an express rejection of the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner,35 in which
the Supreme Court held, interpreting New York law, that a financing arrange-
ment which gave the debtor unfettered dominion over the collateral was
fraudulent as to third parties, and hence void as a matter of Iaw. In repudiating
the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, the draftsmen of the Code noted that it had
since been rejected in a number of states, in both accounts receivable and
inventory financing."
The security interest in after-acquired property has equal status with
interests obtained in existing property, except that the Code permits sub-
sequent purchase money security interests to take priority if certain notice
27
 District court cases prior to Lake had not been in harmony. See Annot., 102
A.L.R. 250, 251 (1936).
23 See note 16 supra.
U.C.C. 9-101, Comment.
3° U.C.C. 4 9-202.
31 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504, Comments 1, 6.
33 Use of these assets as collateral can be an important source of capital for many
types of businesses. See Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of Long-Term
Capital, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 506 (1952) ; Kripke, Secured Transactions—Financing the
Seller, 76 Banking L.J. 185 (1959); Lowenstein, Assignments of Accounts Receivable and
the Bankruptcy Act, 1 Rutgers L. Rev. I (1947). For a discussion of pre-Code financing
devices of this type, see Ogline, The Factors Lien Act as a Method of Inventory Financing,
4 W. Res. L. Rev. 336 (1953).
	U.C.C.
	 9-204(3).
	34 U.C.C.
	 9-205.
35 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
36 U.C.C. 4 9-205, Comment 2.
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requirements are met." Thus, if the security interest in inventory or accounts
receivable is properly perfected, the debtor may use the collateral as his
business needs indicate. The creditor's security interest is nonetheless protected
from all claims except those of: (1) prior holders of perfected security interests
in the same property, 38 (2) subsequent holders of perfected purchase money
security interests," and (3) buyers in the ordinary course of business."
Under the Code, a security interest becomes perfected when the last
of the following four events occurs: (1) the parties agree that the interest
should attach, (2) value is given by the creditor, (3) the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral,41 and (4) the creditor takes a prescribed additional
step, usually the filing of a financing statement." In the case of after-acquired
property, the interest will usually be perfected when the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral, the other steps having been taken earlier.
IV. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Since the Code explicitly delays perfection of an interest in a specific
account or item of inventory until the debtor acquires rights in it," many
such "transfers" of the debtor's property will naturally occur within four
months of bankruptcy. They will thus be subject to avoidance as preferences,
since the debt which they secure antedates the transfer. The Code attempts
to obviate this difficulty and protect the floating lien from the preference
challenge. Section 9-108 provides that a security interest in after-aquired
property which the debtor acquires in the ordinary course of his business
shall be deemed to have been taken for new value at the time it becomes
perfected (in most cases when the debtor acquires rights in it), provided
that new value was given originally."
Although the bankruptcy courts must look to state law to determine the
validity of a security interest, several commentators have predicted that
section 9-108 would not be given effect." The principal basis for their
position is that by adopting the mere presumption of a contemporaneous
exchange for new value, state law cannot alter the simple fact that the
attachment and perfection of the security interest occurs some time after
the obligation of the debtor arises. Section 9-108 is said to have no other
purpose than to protect a perfected security interest from the preference
37 U.C.C.	 9-312(3), (4).
38 U.C.C.	 9-312(5)(b).
39 U.C.C.	 9-312(3), (4).
4° U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
41 These first three events constitute the requirements for attachment of a security
interest. U.C.C. § 9-204. At this point, the property becomes subject to a security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-303, Comment 1.
42 	§ 9-302 provides that with certain exceptions, all security interests must be
perfected by filing. Section 9-303 states in effect that the interest becomes perfected only
when it has attached and when filing or other necessary steps are taken, regardless of the
order in which the events occur.
43 U.C.C. § 9 -204.
44 Section 9-108 is set out in full at note 8 supra.
46 E.g., 3 Collier 11 60.51A[7.21; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 548-49; Riemer, supra
note 3.
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challenge," and it is clear that the bankruptcy courts are not bound to
follow state law which contravenes the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' This is
essentially the position which was adopted by the referee in Portland News."
At least two writers, however, have expressed the opinion that the
preference challenge can be avoided even without section 9-108. 49 Their
argument centers around the fact that a security interest in after-acquired
property becomes perfected automatically. Consequently, perfection of the
security interest in the individual components is considered unimportant and
the collateral—either inventory or receivables—is treated as a single entity.
Under these circumstances, the transfer is said to occur when the debtor and
creditor have agreed, value is given, and the creditor satisfies statutory
requirements for notice to third parties.
Judicial support for this theory comes from a dictum of Chief Judge
Magruder in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche.° In that case, an assignment
of future accounts receivable was held to be a voidable preference. In
discussing the applicable state law,9 ' however, the judge indicated that a
similar result would not be reached in the case of inventory financing:
In other words, the res which is the subject of the lien provided
in Section 1 [of the New Hampshire statute] is the merchandise
or stock in trade, conceived of as a unit presently and continuously
in existence—a "floating mass," the component elements of which
may be constantly changing without affecting the identity of the
res.52
 (Emphasis added.)
Under such an interpretation, the fact that particular accounts or
items of inventory have come into existence within four months of bank-
ruptcy would not mean that the security interest in those accounts was
transferred at that time. Applying this theory in a similar situation arising
under the Code, it is said that if reference is made solely to Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act, the date of transfer could be set at the point when no lien
creditor could obtain superior rights in the collateral. 53
 In that case, the date
of transfer would be the date at which all requirements for perfection were
met, except for the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral. The argu-
ment is that the floating lien is thus perfected in terms of section 60, and it is
therefore irrelevant whether it is perfected under the Code. Under this inter-
46 I Coogan, Hogan, & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. § 11.07[1]
(1966); Rioner, supra note 3, at 66.
97 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
98 Supra note 5, at 71143-44.
4 D Friedman, supra note 3, at 215; Hanna, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy,
14 Rutgers L. Rev. 471, 486 (1960).
5° 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
51 N.H. Rev. Laws ch. 262-A (1949).
52 186 F.2d at 831.
53
 [A]ssuming secured party had taken proper steps to perfect his security
interest, perfection occurs the moment the debtor has rights in the collateral,
whatever those rights are, which leaves no gap during which the debtor has any
rights upon which a creditor could attach or levy ahead of the security interest.
Hart & Willier, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial Code 11 94.05, at
9-336 (1966).
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pretation, the security interest in after-acquired inventory or accounts would
be protected from the preference challenge, notwithstanding the fact that
some or all of the collateral has come under the lien within the four-month
period.
Read as a whole, Article 9 of the Code clearly seeks this kind of result.
Section 9-108 seems to be conclusive evidence that the draftsmen sought to
provide a system which would permit the floating lien to escape the preference
challenge. That is not to say, however, that the result can be achieved in the
bankruptcy courts without section 9-108; the Code has not adopted Chief
Judge Magruder's characterization of the collateral as a unit. What it does
provide, on the other hand, is that the creditor has no interest in individual
items of after-acquired collateral until the debtor acquires rights in them."
In Portland News, the court held that under the Code's floating lien
the creditor had no interest in the after-acquired collateral until the debtor
acquired rights in it, and, therefore, no "transfer" from the debtor to the
creditor could take place until that time. Collier strongly supports this
interpretation:
A transfer includes the voluntary fixing of a lien upon the prop-
erty, for example, by way of security. Taking the Bankruptcy Act
together with the Code, it is certainly arguable that a transfer
occurs whenever the security interest attached to after-acquired
property. . . . The U.C.C. is explicit in its requirement that the
debtor have rights in the collateral before the security interest
can attach. It would therefore appear unreasonable to construe
the interest attaching at any earlier date . .55
In Portland News, the referee adopted this interpretation of the Code
and simultaneously negated the effect of section 9-108. The result is that the
flexibility with which the floating lien can be used has been severely limited;
it will no longer be possible for the debtor to exercise dominion over inventory
or accounts when these assets are used as collateral.
The referee pointed out that the preference problem could have been
avoided if the creditor had "policed" the collateral." This, he said, would re-
quire an initial assignment of accounts to the creditor at the time an advance
was made. The proceeds of these accounts would then be placed in a cash
collateral account, over which the debtor would have no control. These
proceeds could be paid over to the debtor in immediate exchange for an
assignment of new accounts. In this way, the preference challenge is avoided
because there is a contemporaneous exchange of value in each subsequent
transaction; the subsequent transfers are for "new value" and not for
antecedent debt. This situation embodies an obvious inconsistency between
the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Act and its implementation by the
courts. The result in Portland News demands that financing of inventory
and accounts be attended by policing of the collateral in order to avoid the
preference challenge. This seems highly inappropriate in view of the purposes
54 U.C.C. §§ 9-204, -302, -303. See p. 107 supra.
55 3 Collier 11 60.51A[7.1], at 1050.15.
56 Supra note 5, at 71136.
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of section 60. The Code's floating lien does not represent a scrambling for
position on the eve of bankruptcy. Moreover, it embodies none of the evils
of the secret lien, with which Congress has dealt directly." The Code's
floating lien is not merely equitable; the creditor need perform no additional
step to perfect his lien when collateral is acquired by the debtor." In addition,
it is not secret; in any case where the security interest covers inventory or
a significant portion of the debtor's accounts, a public filing is required."
Certainly the substitution of collateral on a revolving basis gives other
creditors no more notice of the lien than do the Code's filing provisions. The
net result of such policing is that the debtor's accounting costs must be
increased with each successive transfer in order to simulate the infusion of
new value.
It is difficult to find any way in which the principles which form the
basis for the present Bankruptcy Act can be served by the policing of assets.
As a practical matter, the principles of Benedict v. Ratner are for the most
part still enforceable by the bankruptcy courts," but this is not to say that
the rules for policing dictated by that decision have any legitimate place in
current bankruptcy law. Originally the rule was required by state law, but
it has been expressly repudiated by the Code," which is now the relevant
state law. Moreover, there is no mention of the requirement for policing in
the Bankruptcy Act, there is thus no statutory basis for its retention. The re-
sult in Portland News is therefore incongruous; because of the intricacies of
the two statutes, the form and not the substance of the transaction made it
vulnerable to the preference challenge. Notwithstanding the absence of a
clearly defined federal policy either against the floating lien in general or in
favor of policing collateral, the Code is frustrated in its attempt to remove
this type of technical obstacle in order to make these transactions more
flexible."
While the result in Portland News perhaps sacrifices Code objectives
for the sake of form, Yale indicates that a reluctance to deal with substance
can similarly frustrate legitimate bankruptcy objectives. The court in that
case was ruling on the secured party's application to reclaim equipment
from a defaulting debtor, who was then undergoing Chapter X reorganization
proceedings. In deciding whether it had the power to postpone the enforcement
of liens on the debtor's equipment, the court relied upon Lake63 and its
progeny in determining exactly which "property" it had the power to protect.
In so doing, it looked to the form of the security agreement to locate "title,"
57 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
58 See U.C.C. 9-204, Comment 2.
59 U.C.C.	 9-302(1).
60 See note 35 supra and accompanying text. The difference is that when Benedict v.
Ratner was in effect, failure to police collateral rendered the entire transaction totally
void, whereas it is now voidable only to the extent that collateral is obtained by the
debtor within four months of bankruptcy, and only if the creditor had reason to believe
that the debtor was insolvent at the time. Considering the nature of the collateral and the
relationship of the parties, the differences may often be insignificant in practice.
61 	9-205.
62 U.C.C. 9-205, Comment 1.
63 In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935).
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and thus it retained the distinctions between the chattel mortgage and the
conditional sale in deciding whether the creditor would be permitted to
reclaim the equipment. This represents a serious limitation on the effectiveness
of the bankruptcy courts in reorganization proceedings; its foundation
should therefore be examined.
In the Lake case, the court noted that the applicable state law"
retained the common law distinctions between the chattel mortgage and the
conditional sale. The court felt that Congress did not intend to ignore the
distinction between property mortgaged by the debtor and property held
by the debtor as a conditional vendee. 65
 The sale had been made under a
conditional sales contract, and the court permitted the property to be
"repossessed and dealt with as the laws of New York provide."66 In a strong
dissent, Judge Learned Hand argued that there were so few differences in
the legal relationships which result from the chattel mortgage and the con-
ditional sale that the location of title ought to be ignored in dealing with
the reorganization of the debtor's property.'"
Under the Code, the distinctions between the two types of transactions
are non-existent as between debtor and creditor," and should not limit in
any way the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over conditionally sold property.
The draftsmen of the Code anticipated this very situation in a comment
to the 1962 Official Text:
But since this Article adopts neither a "title" nor a "Iien" theory
of security interests, .. . the granting or denying of, for example,
petitions of reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings should not
be influenced by speculations as to whether the secured party had
"title" to the collateral or "merely a lien." 69
By continuing to acknowledge this distinction, the bankruptcy courts
tend to limit the Code's abolition of distinctions which are no longer necessary
for ordinary commercial practice. In this particular case, the effect upon the
implementation of the Code's basic policies is insubstantial; what is more
important is the apparently self-imposed limitation on the courts' power to
carry out the rehabilitation of debtors under the Bankruptcy Act. It should
be recognized that it is the courts, and not the act itself, which equate "prop-
erty" with "title." In so doing, they are permitting the perhaps otherwise
meaningless choice of printed forms to determine whether equipment vital
to a successful reorganization can be protected from reclamation until the
reorganization is accomplished. Conversely, of course, the choice of forms is
no longer "meaningless," as all secured parties will endeavor to use a title
retention device in the future.
Surely there is ample reason to re-examine the Lake case in the light
of present day chattel security law. Any support which that decision may have
64 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was then the governing statute in New York.
65 79 F.2d at 328.
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 329.
63 U.C.C. § 9-202. See p. 106 supra.
89 U.C.C. § 9-507, Comment 1.
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derived from state law is absent under the Code; indeed the Code provides
exactly the opposite. In any event, if the rehabilitation of the debtor will
serve a more useful end, it hardly seems appropriate to risk a liquidation, with
a potentially greater loss to creditors in general, when it could be avoided by
putting this aspect of the debtor-creditor relationship into a more realistic
perspective.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Yale and Portland News cases serve to illustrate specific problems
associated with the implementation of the Code and the Bankruptcy Act;
neither case appears to achieve a satisfactory reconciliation of the two statutes
in the bankruptcy courts. The problems lie not in the fact that the statutes
are in conflict, but rather in the fact that in each case the ultimate resolution
of the conflict cannot be directly identified with a paramount bankruptcy
interest in that result.
There are many broad social and economic factors which must be
balanced in order to deal satisfactorily with the subject of bankruptcy. It
may well be true that shaky, undercapitalized businesses operated through
financing of inventory and accounts receivable are a trap for their employees
and for the suppliers who extend unsecured credit. Wage earners have no
practical means of obtaining security for back wages, and day-to-day suppliers
in a competitive environment have little choice but to extend unsecured
credit. This is said to be inherently unfair in the event of bankruptcy,
because it is their goods and services which become the very collateral which
secures the floating lien. 70 In addition, it is foreseeable that the incidence of
technical error in perfecting security interests will decrease under the simpli-
fied procedures of the Code, with the result that fewer secured transactions
will be defeated in bankruptcy, and the funds for payment of unsecured
creditors will be diminished still further. 7 '
An analysis of these and similar problems, adequate to permit any
general conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the present bankruptcy
system, is not within the scope of this comment. What is suggested here is
that the adoption of the Code has radically altered certain relationships
between state-created security interests and federal bankruptcy law. These
changes can have so great an impact commercially that it is undesirable to
70
 Raphael, The Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the Modern Law of Secured
Transactions, 2 B.C..Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 303, 318 (1961).
71 In liquidation cases, the unsecured creditor recovers almost nothing from a
bankrupt debtor. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, for example, the courts disposed
of 145,655 straight bankruptcy cases. Of these, 18,513 were "asset" cases, with an average
payment to creditors of $5,227 per case. An additional 19,008 cases were "nominal asset"
cases, in which assets of the estate were consumed by administrative costs, and in the
remaining 108,134 cases there were no assets available after exemptions. Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics, Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1965, Comments, pp. 1-7.
In the relatively few asset cases, secured creditors were paid 60.7% of their claims, and
unsecured creditors received 7.5%. Id. at Table F.6. An examination of these statistics
for the last twenty years indicates that when an unsecured creditor is fortunate enough to
find some assets in the debtor's estate, on the average he is not likely to recover more
than eight or nine cents on the dollar.
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permit the courts to continue to apply bankruptcy law not specifically
designed to deal with the Code. Problems which the Code creates in bank-
ruptcy should be recognized for what they are and faced directly. Anachro-
nistic guidelines must be abandoned, especially if, as in Yale, they can permit
a secured creditor to gain a decided advantage over others similarly situated
under state law. Such an advantage is clearly contrary to the basic principles
of bankruptcy law.
It has been demonstrated that policing of assets works no essential
changes in the floating lien's effect on other creditors. After Portland News,
however, policing is a conclusive requirement. If the lien on current and
future assets is itself an evil, then it should be banned effectively and com-
pletely. If it is only objectionable when used by shaky, undercapitalized
businesses, then these circumstances should be identified and dealt with by the
Bankruptcy Act. It is self-delusion to assume that failure to police will
defeat only liens which are in some way objectionable or that it will be
effective to defeat all such liens. It is equally absurd to assume that where
these objectionable characteristics do not exist, all the parties will find policing
to be an efficient and desirable commercial technique. In most cases, com-
mercial considerations would probably tend to dictate the opposite result. 72
With the widespread acceptance of the Code as the law under which
the debtor and his creditors operate, it would be well for Congress to
re-examine the Bankruptcy Act and to make such amendments as are neces-
sary to clearly state bankruptcy policy in terms which acknowledge the
Code's innovations. If specific changes to the Code are also necessary to
achieve these bankruptcy goals with a minimum of unnecessary commercial
inconvenience in other areas, then the draftsmen of the amendments to both
statutes should perhaps work more closely than in the past. 73
F. ANTHONY MAIO
72
 It has been indicated that secured creditors police the collateral in any case in
which there is danger of insolvency or carelessness of the debtor. See Note, Policing
Accounts Receivable and Inventory Under Modern Factor's Legislation, 101 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 392 (1952).
73
 The U.C.C. was drafted during the same period as the 1950 amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act. The lack of any communication at that time has been noted. 2 Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property § 45.3.3, at 1303 n.15 (1965).
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